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Informational Social Influence and Product Evaluation
by
Joel B. Cohen and Ellen Golden
For many, the application of social influence research is
limited to rather specialized settings (e.g. formal group inter-
action or structured authority relationships) or tied to the notion
of conformity or conformity-proneness. This view tends to under-
state the pervasiveness of social influence and its importance to
human behavior. Informational social influence, especially, has
not received its due consideration in many settings and under many
circumstances in which it is likely to be a significant factor in
decision-making and overt behavior.
Product evaluation may prove to be an especially fertile
setting within which informational social influence is likely to
operate. Products are typically evaluated relative to a number of
competing needs and demands on individual and family resources.
Resulting questions of value judgements, which are themselves not
completely reducible to objective evidence and matters of fact,
are without doubt subject to social frames of reference. "Appro-
priate" or "correct" behavior is such, in large part, because of the
evidence we have that others agree with or accept the behavior.
Aside from questions of value, the very complexity of product
evaluation itself (e.g. the number of brands and models, the

-2-
claims and counterclaims, the difficulty of obtaining objective
evidence) and the time it would take to resolve the many uncer-
tainties combine to favor the utilization of information from
others
,
The study to be reported focuses specifically on three poten-
tial sources of influence on a consumer's judgment in social
situations: (1) the uniformity of relevant information provided
by others (2) the extent to which one's judgment (evaluation)
will be known to others and (3) one's interpersonal response
orientations.
Many of the early "conformity" studies failed to distinguish
clearly between two processes of social Influence whose differences
are of considerable importance (Asch, 1958; Crutchfield, 1955;
Sherif, 1958). The first, "normative social influence," refers to
Influence to conform with certain expectations held by others.
The second, "informational social influence," refers to Influence
to accept Information provided by others which is taken as evidence
about reality.^ The former might be termed "conformity" in the
sense that one accepts influence either to establish or enhance a
favorable reward-punishment relationship with certain individuals
or because of a desire to identify with such individuals or their
points of view (Kelman, 1961). The second, however, is not true
conformity, in the sense that a lack of information, an ambiguous
situation, or premature demands for action or decision lead the
person to substitute seemingly competent information from others
•leri-* t e
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for his own search for direct evidence. Indeed direct, physical
and objective evidence regarding the "truth" of many of our beliefs
(and especially values) is simply not easily obtainable. For many
of these our primary point of reference may be other individuals
or groups, and our reality, therefore, is socially as well as
physically determined.
Under either informational or normative conditions, the
uniformity of information provided by others regarding the rela-
tive quality of a product should have a direct bearing on consumers'
evaluations. This should be especially true when (1) quality is
somewhat ambiguous because of a lack of clear standards, and (2)
one's own ability to discriminate is not thought satisfactory.
Venkatesan (1966) demonstrates that social influence is operative
in this type of product evaluation situation. We prefer to
characterize the process he studied not as "conformity to group
pressure" (as he has done) but rather as "informational social
influence,"
Stafford (1966) provides an interesting picture of informal
groxip influence on brand preferences within sociometrically
determined "natural" groups. Here the setting is conducive to
both influence processes, although the relative strength of norma-
tive influence would almost certainly be greater for an object or
issue of greater relevance to the group (around which norms could
develop) than bread.
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In order to more adequately study conditions underlying the
acceptance of social influence, it is necessary to go beyond a
one-way flow of information and influence (from the group to the
individual). Such a conceptualization is too narrow and does not
consider others' subsequent reactions to the behavior of the
individual, especially the extent of his acceptance or rejection
of group influence. It seems especially important to separate out
the effects of factors which influence public acceptance of infor-
mation from those which influence adherence to such information.
Adherence should follow directly from uniformity, for example,
under conditions supportive of informational social influence. If
an individual has merely expressed public acceptance (under
conditions favoring normative influence), his perception that
others will be able to maintain surveilance and impose sanctions
may be necessary conditions for adherence. In the classic con-
formity studies, either subjects' evaluations or behaviors were
perceived to be visible to others. In this study we will
specifically examine the Importance of this factor under infor-
mational social influence conditions.
Interpersonal response orientations refer to people's pre-
dominant modes of response to others. They can be thought of as
interpersonal aspects of personality. Using Karen Horney's tri-
partite classification of moving towards, against or away from
others, Cohen (1967) developed the CAD scale to measure the extent
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of a person's corresponding compliant, aggressive and detached
interpersonal orientations. As predicted, compliant people were more
susceptible to information regarding group judgments than were
aggressive people, although (at least in the absence of group
pressure and overt influence attempts) no significant differences
in detached orientations among high and low opinion changers were
observed (Campbell, 1966),
Most people seem to have a reasonable balance among the orien-
tations so that although one is usually preferred (more consistent
with other values, more often reinforced in social interaction) the
person remains flexible to the demands of the situation. Even a
highly aggressive person may refrain from aggressive behavior under
certain physical or moral constraints. To the extent that more
specific situational influences (such as the substantive issues,
objects, who the other people are, task requirements, etc.)
encourage the expression of individual differences, we should find
some correspondence between behavior and preferred modes of relat-
ing to others. Accordingly, interpersonal response orientations
were an additional factor incorporated into the design of the
study.
METHOD
Each of three groups of 48 introductory marketing students at
the University of Illinois was randomly assigned to four treat-
ment conditions to form three blocks of 12 S's within each.

Treatments are summarized in Table 1, Each of the three groups
was made up entirely of individuals scoring at least one standard
deviation above the sample mean on one of the traits measured by
the CAD scale, a set of 35 items each calling for a response
Insert Table 1 About Here
relative to the desirability of engaging in particularly character-
istic types of interpersonal behavior (Cohen, 1967)
.
Students were given to believe that a marketing research
project was being conducted to predict the likely success of a
new coffee product recently introduced in the area. Under both
the high uniformity-visible and low uniformity-visible conditions
S's were individually shown a rating board containing other S's
evaluations of the coffee they were instructed to taste and
evaluate. The rating board was a large and attractive piece of
heavy cardboard subdivided into five general categories for
evaluation (from "worst I've ever tasted" to 'best I've ever tasted")
each, in turn, broken down into three degrees of favorability -
or 15 response categories in all. Under each category were a
set of small nails, name tags being hung on a predetermined number,
the effect in total looking very much like a frequency distribution
histogram. Name tags (many similar to but none identical with
other s's names) were written in a large number of handwriting
styles and with different pens and colors of ink.
Each S in these two treatments saw 16 name tags representing
others' prior evaluations of the coffee. In both treatments, the
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modal "evaluation" (preset by E) was "12" (compared to the control
group's mean evaluation of 8.5). We wished to produce a reasonable
discrepancy for those whose own estimates were at or several rating
points above the mean, yet without danger of a ceiling effect.
In the high uniformity condition 9 of the name tags were placed
on the modal rating with the remaining 7 concentrated as follows:
1 on "10", 2 on "11", and 4 on "13V In the low uniformity condi-
tion 5 name tags were placed on the modal position with the others
as follows: 1 on "5", 1 on "7", 2 on "8", 1 on "9", 1 on "10",
2 on "11", and 3 on "13". Thus, each S in the high uniformity
condition was exposed to the same information (without risk of
bias by confederates' actions) with a substantially greater consensus
than S's in the low uniformity condition. Any number of variations
in the dispersion of others' evaluations (including the identifi-
cation of certain S's) could be used to easily vary and standardize
the information provided under possible treatments, however, only
the two variations discussed above were incorporated into this
study.
After tasting the coffee, each S in these two conditions
wrote his name on a tag and placed it on the board. Since the
name tag would always be placed last in any column chosen, S's
could not reasonably expect their evaluations to be hidden from
others no matter where it was placed. After each S left the
room, E removed his name tag from the board.
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The third treatment, the no Information-visible condition, was
used to separate out the effects of Information presumably provided
by others from the expectation that others will know how one has
evaluated the product. As such this provides a control group for
the factor "uniformity of information" as well as a direct
comparison with the no information-no visibility control group
(treatment four).^ S's in treatment three were given to believe
that theirs was the first name tag to be placed on the chart for a
"new group of tasters". E explained simply that the procedure was
to let the board get fairly well filled, copy a summary of the
evaluations, take the tags off and start all over again. This
procedure was used for each of the 36 S's in this condition.
The fourth treatment utilized a rating form identical in scale
to the rating board. Evaluations of the coffee were obtained in
the absence of information from others. The rating form was simply
taken from S's and placed in a stack.
In total, the methodology was designed to create a setting in
which a small-to-moderate amount of uncertainty regarding a "correct'
product evaluation could be tied to variations in informational
input from others. No attempt was made to build in factors which
would tend to produce normative Influences. In such a setting it
was hypothesized that Informational social influence would be
accepted for its own sake and not for reasons of conformity.

RESULTS
A 4 X 3 factorial analysis of variance (treatments by inter-
personal orientations) was run. Differences in treatment effects
were significant and in the predicted direction (Table 2).
Insert Table 2 about here
Analysis of the significant treatment effect by orthogonal
trend components revealed that 99.01 percent of the variation in
evaluation by treatments (SS treatments z. 99.69) may be predicted
from a linear regression equation (Winer, 1962). This tends to
indicate (1) that the acceptance of social influence was a linear
function of the degree of uniformity or consensus in the informa-
tion presented, and (2) that no complex interaction between uni-
formity and visibility was present. Further analysis of these
interrelationships was conducted using an orthogonal decomposition
of the treatment sxim of squares and comparisons among treatment
sums (Winer, 1962). Table 3 summarizes the four comparisons used
to separate out the effects of uniformity and visibility. Com-
parison 1 in Table 3, for example, looks at the following weighted
linear comparison of treatment sums: /.(T]^ + T2 + T-)/3_/ - T^.
Approximately 55 percent of the variation among treatments (54.19/
99.69) is due to the difference between the control group (no
Insert Table 3 about here
information-no visibility) and the other treatments combined.
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To what extent is this difference due to the Infonnatlon seemingly
provided by other S's or to the known visibility of one's own
evaluation? If the latter, then the informational social influence
hypothesis (i.e. influence is accepted largely because it reduces
uncertainty) cannot be supported since S*s would appear to be more
concerned with anticipating others' positive or negative reactions.
F ratios on comparison sums of squares (e.g. SScj^/MSerror) per-
mitted more definitive answers to these questions.
Comparison 2 (Table 3) reveals a significant difference (and
in the predicted direction) between the two groups provided with
information regarding "others'" evaluations and the group not given
such information, all three groups believing their evaluations to
be visible to others. Comparison 4, on the other hand, indicates
that visibility, per se, is not a significant source of variation
when information is held constant. Approximately 30 percent of the
variation among treatments is due to comparison 2, while only 8
percent is due to comparison 4. We must conclude that visibility
is not a significant feature of this social influence situation
in which informational social influence appears to predominate
over normative social influence.
Comparison 3 indicates that acceptance of social influence is
not significantly greater under high uniformity than under low
uniformity, although results are in the predicted direction
(Table 1).
Interpersonal response orientations did not prove to be a
significant source of Variation, although the direction of results
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fits the underlying model. Compliant S's were the most favorable
in their product evaluations (X = 9,96), Aggressive S's were
least favorable (X = 9.25), while detached S's were Intermediate
(X = 9.48).
DISCUSSICW
These results provide strong confirmation that social in-
fluence is operative in situations not characterized by strong
normative pressures (cohesive groups, relevant issues, established
norms, sanctions, etc.) Buying decisions, even when the product
or brand being judged is not novel or unfamiliar, seem to be
characterized by uncertainty. This may stem, in part, from a
lack of objective standards and a lack of reliable comparative
brand information. Such conditions should tend to produce a
heightened readiness to respond to apparently competent informa-
tion from others.
The absence of a more pronounced difference between high and
low uniformity treatment groups is somewhat surprising. Our mani-
pulation rf uniformity was tied to a range of S's coffee evaluations,
however, rather than markedly contrasting conditions of unanimous
agreement among others versus sharp disagreement. Uniformity,
in this study, is a somewhat more involved notion than in most
similar studies. In many previous studies, information from others
was uniform if it was absolutely identical (i.e. each confederate
gave the exact same answer or "caused" the exact same light to
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go on). Here, the focus is on product evaluation which can only be
forced into a similar conception of uniformity either by collapsing
the evaluation task into two or three categories (so as to make
perfect consensus believable) or by telling the subject you are
providing him with consensus data (e.g. group means).
In reality, of course, it is seldom that no variation exists
in the advice and opinions others so thoughtfully supply. We
do not move instantly from uncertainty to certainty by virtue of
the information received. There is doubt and disagreement, and
it may be of some value for researchers to more realistically deal
with variance in information, specifically in so far as learning
how consumers respond to it. It may be that consumers (or at least
our S's) tend to rely on specific information aggregation schemes
such as a modal evaluation or some other simplifying rule of thumb
in dealing with the results of diversity in product ratings.
Since the mode was the same in both the high uniformity and low
uniformity conditions (12), we might possibly have provided much
less of a difference in the two uniformity conditions than was
desirable for maximal effect upon evalxiations.
The failure of interpersonal response traits to be a more
discriminating predictor variable may, to a large extent, be an
artifact of the methodology employed. We note with interest that
compliant S's gave evaluations closest to the mode, hence more
similar to their peers. Aggressive S's were furthest from the
mode, thus consistent with a movement "against" the typical response.
!:!•
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Detached S's were intermediate, neither responding strongly pro
norm nor counter norm. It may be recalled that the methodology
minimized social interaction and direct influence attempts, two of
the factors in social influence situations which one would expect
to be most strongly related to this tjrpe of treatment of individual
differences.
CONCLUSION
S's asked to evaluate an unknown brand of coffee were signi-
ficantly influenced by rating distributions (other S's evaluations)
of both relatively high and low concentration (uniformity). There
was some tendency for acceptance of the modal evaluation to be
greater under conditions of higher uniformity. The difference
between high and low uniformity conditions was, however, not
significant. This may have been due to the uniformity manipulations
which dealt more with degree of dispersion than more absolute
dichotomies. Perceived visibility of S's subsequent ratings was
not a significant factor leading to the acceptance of information
from others. Differences in S's interpersonal orientations did
not prove to be a significant factor, although results were in the
predicted direction.
Our data suggest that even for a familiar product whose taste
was the sole criterion for evaluation, individual judgments may
be modifiable by the perceived evaluations of others. No attempt
was made to convey information of a more expert nature or in any
way encourage S's to feel the information was somehow reliable or
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accurate. Thus, even under minimal conditions for social In-
fluence, ouch Information had a significant effect on product
evaluation. These results are interpreted as supporting the
pervaalveness and significance of Informational social influence
even When conditions fsivorlng normative compliance are largely
absent.
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3A before-after design with an Initial private rating and
one after seeing others' ratings would have permitted equivalent
comparisons. The present design was chosen (1) to avoid sensiti-
zing S*s to the fact that the information is "supposed to" make
a difference in your evaluation and (2) to prevent post-committment
dissonance from influencing the vesults.
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Table 1
Mean Values Under Each Treatment Condition
Treatment
Uniformity in
Others' Evaluations
Visibility of
S's Behavior
Mean Product
Evaluation
High uniformity Visible 10.75
Low uniformity Visible 9.83
No information Visible 9.17
No information Not visible 8.50
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Table 2
Analysis of Variance
Source of variation df M.S. F
Treatments 3 33.23 4.65*
Interpersonal orientations 2 6.27 .88
Interaction 6 2.55 .36
Error 132 7.15
*p < .005
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Table 3
Comparisons On Treatment Sums
High uniformity Low uniformity No information No information ss F
-visible -visible -visible -not visible
E 387 354 330 306
\ 1 1 1 -3 54.19 7 . 58**
C2 1 1 -2 30.38 4.25*
^3 1 -1 15.13 2.12
^4 1 -1 8.00 1.12
*p<.05
**p<.01
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